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Abstract
 
We report on one aspect of a study that explored the views and experiences of 
practitioners and scientists on social, ethical and clinical dilemmas encountered 
when working in the ﬁeld of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for serious 
genetic disorders. The study produced an ethnography based on observation, 
interviews and ethics discussion groups with staff from two PGD/IVF Units in 
the UK. We focus here on staff perceptions of work with embryos that entails 
disposing of ‘affected’ or ‘spare’ embryos or using them for research. A variety 
of views were expressed on the ‘embryo question’ in contrast to polarised media 
debates. We argue that the prevailing policy acceptance of destroying affected 
embryos, and allowing research on embryos up to 14 days leaves some staff with 
rarely reported, ambivalent feelings. Staff views are under-researched in this area 
and we focus on how they may reconcile their personal moral views with the ethical 
framework in their ﬁeld. Staff construct embryos in a variety of ways as ‘moral work 
objects’. This allows them to shift attention between micro-level and overarching 
institutional work goals, building on Casper’s concept of ‘work objects’ and 
focusing on negotiation of the social order in a morally contested ﬁeld.
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Introduction
 
The ﬁeld of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is a morally contentious one, including
such issues as when life begins and when it begins to be morally signiﬁcant; the notion of
a ‘pre-embryo’; the selection of some embryos and the discarding of others; and when it
can be justiﬁed to use embryos for research (
 
e.g.
 
 Spallone 1989, Farsides 
 
et al.
 
 2005, Krones
 
et al.
 
 2006). In the UK, media debates about the ‘embryo question’ have tended to be
polarised, but policy and professional commitments to offering patients a ‘choice’ of embryos
have coalesced in an ‘ofﬁcial’ account of the ethics of PGD, including acceptance of the
destruction of ‘affected’ or ‘spare’ embryos and of a 14-day limit for embryo research. The
expression in legislation and regulation of this account might be assumed to some extent
both to reﬂect and to underpin professional attitudes towards the status and use of embryos.
Re-use of this article is permitted in accordance with the Creative Commons Deed, 
Attribution 2.5, which does not permit commercial exploitation. 
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However, one effect of the achievement of a workable ofﬁcial framework is that further
public debate on the ‘embryo question’ in particular has been discouraged, and little has
been reported of the experiences and views of the practitioners and scientists who carry
out this novel form of genetic and reproductive technology. In particular, little is known of
how staff understand the moral meaning and signiﬁcance of embryos, and how this relates
to work goals in the application of new reproductive technologies.
 
Policy background
 
As Mary Warnock (2006) has recently commented, ‘the relation between private morality and
a public policy that is democratically acceptable is a subtle and complicated interrelation’.
New genetic technologies intensify long-standing contrasts between the public and private
spheres (Parker 2000: 160). However, it is rarely acknowledged that professionals working
in this area need to straddle a number of ethical boundaries such as accommodating
differences between private and public views and interests, including their own (Farsides
 
et al.
 
 2005, Ehrich 
 
et al.
 
 2006, Wainwright 
 
et al.
 
 2006).
In the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), established by
the 
 
HFE Act 1990
 
, is responsible for licensing all forms of assisted reproduction and
consequently PGD, which uses IVF technology in order to create and access the three-day-
old embryo for biopsy. The establishment of the HFEA was crucial to the passage of the
Act, because it represented the means by which scientiﬁc and medical research would be
subject to public acceptance and accountability, and as such has been argued to be a form
of ‘sociological’ regulation (Franklin and Roberts 2006). Another principle on which the
HFEA’s work rests is acceptance of the pre-14-day embryo as lacking distinct individual
moral status. This paved the way for PGD and research on embryos, but was only reached
after nearly a decade of political turmoil stemming, on the one hand, from long-standing
conﬂicts over the status of embryos in relation to abortion; and, on the other, claims about
therapeutic beneﬁts made by the medical and scientiﬁc communities and affected families.
In the last stages of debate prior to the 1990 Act being passed, an emphasis on the beneﬁts
of testing embryos for serious genetic conditions was used to garner and galvanise support
for research on embryos (Mulkay 1997). As Warnock recounts, ‘Utilitarian considerations
came in, insofar as the beneﬁts to the infertile and to society at large were cited in justiﬁca-
tion of research. The consequences to the embryos were discounted’ (Warnock 2006).
In subsequent legislation, and guidance from the HFEA since 1990, references to the
destruction of embryos have been conﬁned to issues of storage and the obligation of licensees
to allow embryos to perish unless they hold the required consents from the relevant parties
(
 
e.g. HFE Act 1990
 
, c.37, section 14). In 2001, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
(Research Purposes) Regulations Act also conveyed the impression that pre-14-day-old
embryos, though worthy of ‘respect’, lacked sufﬁcient moral status to outweigh the presumed
common good of ﬁnding cures for serious disease (Deckers 2005). In the same year, the
European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology Task Force on Ethics and
Law (2001) also concluded: ‘the cryopreserved pre-implantation embryo is not 
 
a full person
 
,
and considering the pre-implantation embryo as a step in the achievement of a parental
project, we do not object to the disposal of the pre-implantation embryo . . . or to the
donation for research’ (2001: 1047, italics added).
More recently, the 
 
HFE Act 1990
 
 has been reviewed, although the consultation document
states that ‘the Government . . . does not intend to open up the most fundamental aspects
of the Act, or those aspects that have been extensively and conclusively debated in recent
years’, for example acceptance of the creation and use of embryos for research, and the
associated destruction of embryos (Department of Health 2005: 63). 
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In short, the question of 
 
destruction
 
 of embryos as a consequence of fertility treatment,
PGD, and research on embryos up to 14 days old, appears to have been largely laid to rest as
a moral, clinical or political issue, despite the efforts of many interested parties (especially
pro-life and religious groups) to keep it on the agenda. Further public debate on this
speciﬁc issue does not appear to be encouraged, although consultations seeking pro-
fessional and public views on other ethical issues continue as part of the ongoing work of
the HFEA and of the current review of the 
 
HFE Act 1990
 
.
 
A polarised media debate
 
Despite this avoidance of further debate on destruction of embryos, the utility of affected
or non-viable PGD and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) embryos for stem cell research (as one
of the more controversial beneﬁciaries of PGD and IVF embryos not used for treatment),
has reopened some of the previous discussions (Franklin 1997, Parry 2003). Williams, Kitzinger
and Henderson (2003) examine discourses surrounding the embryo in mass media discus-
sions of stem cell research and note that the mass media structure these discourses as a binary
debate between those who regard such research as an abuse of embryos, and those who
regard the beneﬁts as outweighing any risks or ethical dilemmas (Parry 2003: 797). Opponents
of stem cell research, echoing earlier opposition to IVF and PGD, focus on when life is
morally signiﬁcant, and how death is deﬁned, speaking of embryos being ‘killed’, in language
rigorously avoided by proponents on the other side of the debate (2003: 803). While it is
important to note that media and policy discourse take place in different arenas, Parry
(2003) argues that the policymaking process relating to the regulation of stem cell
research has followed this pattern of polarisation, especially around the ‘embryo question’,
and that these debates have reinvigorated the ‘pro-life’ campaign against the use of embryos.
The polarising of debates in the media about the embryo may reﬂect contrasting views
in a broader audience, but many professionals in this ﬁeld feel misrepresented in that arena.
Similarly, it is not clear that the trend in policy making which seems to favour the utilitarian
view of embryos is a complete and accurate picture of the views of those working in the
ﬁeld. We argue that there is a need to investigate clinical and scientiﬁc professionals’ views
as there is some evidence (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley and Tutton 2007, Kerr and Franklin
2006) that contrary to possible assumptions about professional views, they may include a
wide range of perspectives, including feelings of uncertainty and ambivalence.
 
Professional ambivalence
 
We now turn to a discussion of ambivalence of relevance to this ofﬁcial account and to our
investigation of the views and experiences of those working in this ﬁeld.
Bauman (1989, 1991) claims that the modernist impulse towards social control and order
is inevitably accompanied by a counter effect of ambiguity and uncertainty. He argues that
in ‘liquid’ or late modernity, these feelings of uncertainty and ambivalence are increasingly
privatised, thwarting their radical collective power. Rather than suppressing the ‘messiness’
of ambivalence and uncertainty, we should embrace it as an act of moral resistance to
rationalising forces. Another consequence of modernity (Giddens 1990) is that institutions
engaging in the production of various kinds of social order may engender similar counter
effects (mistrust, challenges to forms of knowledge) and become caught up in ‘the permanent
monitoring of social practices in the light of incoming information about these practices
themselves’ (Giddens 1990: 38). ‘Institutional reﬂexivity’ describes the capacity for perpetual
monitoring of social practices which are constantly examined, reframed and reﬂexively
managed. Management of dissenting views, perhaps including the personal management of
ambivalence, becomes part of a successful reﬂexive response in conditions of modernity 
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and counter-modernity (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000, Kerr, Cunningham-Burley
and Tutton 2007).
Kerr and Cunningham-Burley argue that reﬂexive modernity, characterised by ‘tensions
between reﬂexivity and objectivity; doubt and certainty; choice and coercion; and change
and convention’ (2000: 285), is more manifest in lay responses to science, technology and
institutions of the new genetics than it is a feature of professional rhetoric in this ﬁeld.
They contrast lay ambivalence about the new human genetics with the professional project
of expanding ‘ethically acceptable’ clinical genetic services (2000: 295), and argue that the
little dissent that does exist is carefully managed. ‘Institutional reﬂexivity’, through profes-
sional inﬂuence on the media and government, co-option of (for example) bioethicists, and
domination of public debate, sets
clear boundaries around which areas are not open for social consideration, [and] 
also allows professionals, associated with the new human genetics, to manage concern 
without undermining research and practice . . . By concentrating on knowable and 
conﬁnable risks associated with the 
 
application
 
 of genetic technologies, professionals 
also side-step more fundamental questions about the values embedded in the new human 
genetics . . . The new human genetics and eugenics are demarcated on the basis of their 
practitioners’ goals and motives (as opposed to the consequences of their work) 
(Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000: 294–295 italics in original).
While such side-stepping may have served to fend off public criticism of their work, we are
concerned in this paper with the silencing effect such boundary-making may have on healthcare
professionals themselves within their own spheres of practice. We did not ﬁnd evidence of
what Bauman (1989) has described as a bureaucratic and functional division of labour that
separates efﬁciency and technical performance of tasks off from their moral content; rather,
we encountered a range of views and processes through which some staff were confronted
with the need to negotiate their relationship to the ethical framework in which they work,
including in particular the suppression of further debate on the status of the embryo.
As Kerr (2004) states, there is a relative lack of literature on professional practice in the
area of human genetics, and, ‘a tendency to black box professionals’ roles, alongside the
genes, knowledge and technologies with which they work’ (2004: 163), resulting in a lack
of knowledge about professional uncertainty and ambivalence. More recently, some evi-
dence has emerged that dissent from the ofﬁcial account in this morally contested ﬁeld
might be difﬁcult to express in a workplace context (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley and Tutton
2007, Kerr and Franklin 2006). We agree that: ‘The challenge to social scientists is to open
up spaces for ambivalence to be more actively and self-consciously articulated and
explored, by both professionals and lay people as well as the many hybrids between them
(Kerr, Cunningham-Burley and Tutton 2007: 68).
In this paper we contribute to this small but growing body of literature by exploring
some ambivalent and/or diverse views amongst a multidisciplinary group of PGD/IVF
staff, and investigate how personal views which diverge from ‘ofﬁcial’ constructions of the
embryo may be managed in relation to the collective enterprise in which staff are engaged.
Our ﬁndings support a strand of Kerr and Cunningham-Burley’s (2000) argument that
focusing on work goals rather than fundamental questions of value may be an important
strategy that allows the work to continue, but we provide data on a speciﬁc topic area that
is not addressed in Kerr and Cunningham-Burley’s (2000) and Kerr, Cunningham-Burley
and Tutton’s (2007) reports of ambivalence in this ﬁeld: professional views on the destruc-
tion of embryos as part of IVF and PGD. 
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We would like to point out that in this paper, we acknowledge that individual members
of staff may need to engage in internal processing of feelings that arise regarding the ethical
issues surrounding destruction of embryos as part of their work, but our main focus is on
the negotiation of such feelings in the context of a particular regulatory and professional
environment. Thus, we address the phenomenon that, from a variety of personal positions,
staff can be seen as acting reﬂexively not so much in the sense of managing 
 
public
 
 ambiva-
lence, as Kerr and Cunningham-Burley (2000) argue, nor entirely as the subjects of external
ethical management, but rather they engage at this level in a reﬂexive process of creating a
workable ethical practice between the personal, professional and regulatory spheres. In a
further reﬂexive turn, this can be valued positively as it can be argued that this level of
ethical consciousness enhances their work and the service they provide to their clients
(Farsides, Williams and Alderson 2005, Franklin and Roberts 2006, Kerr, Cunningham-
Burley and Tutton 2007).
 
The embryo as ‘moral work object’
 
We start from the recognition that embryos are socially, culturally and politically constructed
(Williams 
 
et al.
 
 2003), and we consider how different constructions of the embryo can exist
within the negotiated order of ethical principles and practice in one assisted conception
unit. Embryos have been thought of as ‘social objects’, 
 
i.e.
 
 objects which are understood
to have socially constructed meanings rather than intrinsic natures (Mead 1934) in a variety
of ways, for example contested political object, commercial entity, sacred object, highly
regulated legal object (Franklin and Roberts 2001; Williams 
 
et al.
 
 2003). How embryos are
constituted as social objects is subject to continual and contextualised change.
Casper’s (1998a) work on how the fetus is constructed in a variety of ways draws on Mead’s
(1934) concept of 
 
social objects
 
, which is extended to include 
 
work objects
 
, described by
Casper as ‘any material entity around which people make meaning and organize their work
practices’. This concept helps her to examine how in fetal surgery, ‘constructions of the
fetus vary depending upon who cares for it, who is attributing meaning, what the work
goals are, and material contingencies such as fetal death’ (Casper 1998a: 19). In addition
she draws on the concept of 
 
negotiated order 
 
(Strauss
 
 et al. 
 
1964, Strauss 1978) in which
understandings and more formal rules, norms, deﬁnitions and policies are also continually
 
remade
 
 through ongoing interactions, 
 
i.e.
 
 they are emergent and contingent (Casper 1998b:
381) and usually also relate to work goals. On the concept of negotiated order, Allen (1997)
observes that social ordering may not always take the form of face-to-face negotiation, and
social order is ‘continuously accomplished rather than negotiated’ (1997: 515). This is
important because, as we argue in this paper, emergent meanings and the organisation of
particular work practices in relation to embryos may also arise through more subtle pro-
cesses than overt negotiation. A variety of these meanings can co-exist while achieving
sufﬁcient adherence to a broader social order – in this case an ofﬁcial ethical and regulatory
formulation – to allow pursuit of an overall work goal. We build on these concepts to
explore how practitioners in the contemporary UK ethical framework and regulatory envi-
ronment relating to reproductive technologies focus on the goals and motives of their work
on embryos, and on certain consequences of their work but not others, constituting the
embryo in ways that continually ‘remake’ the locally enacted social order. We deﬁne our
further category of moral work object as a social object around which people make mean-
ing and organise work practices in a morally contested ﬁeld. The use of the term ‘moral
work object’ is not intended to denote a sense that there is a ‘good’ way of constructing
the embryo, or that staff simplistically or uncritically adhere to the idea of a ‘normal’
embryo; rather it is used in the more neutral sense of a category of objects around which 
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people make meanings in a morally contested ﬁeld. We will argue that staff accomplish or
‘remake’ the formally negotiated social order at the same time as constituting the embryo
in a variety of forms of ‘moral work object’. More broadly, this paper adds to the small
but growing ﬁeld of sociological studies that explore ethics in clinical settings (de Vries and
Conrad 1998, Haimes 2002, Williams 2006).
 
Clinical background
 
The treatment goal of PGD is to produce a ‘healthy baby’. This entails discarding embryos
which have not been selected for transfer to the woman’s womb for implantation. PGD can
be offered to couples who are at risk of having a child with a serious genetic condition, or
in some cases, to couples who have experienced repeated miscarriage due to chromosome
rearrangements such as reciprocal translocation (Braude 
 
et al.
 
 2002). IVF is used to create
embryos in the laboratory, from which one or two cells, or blastomeres, can be tested for
speciﬁc genetic disorders. Currently in the UK, up to two unaffected embryos can then be
transferred to the woman, where they may successfully implant. PGD embryos affected by
the genetic disease being tested for may be donated for research or allowed to perish. PGD
is offered in about eight centres in the UK, which must be licensed by the Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Authority (HFEA). To date licences have been issued for the testing
of about 70 genetic conditions. As well as avoiding termination of an established fetus, one
of the key advantages of PGD is to avoid repeated termination of pregnancies following
antenatal diagnosis of genetic disease, which may have serious and long-term effects on
women/couples (Lavery 
 
et al.
 
 2002).
In some cases the social and ethical issues pertaining to PGD include or overlap with
considerations relating to IVF. As many of the staff we interviewed work across the areas
of IVF and PGD, their comments often apply to both ﬁelds, but where there are important
implications to be drawn from the distinction, we highlight them. The key distinction
between PGD and IVF for the purpose of this paper is that PGD embryos may be discarded
not only because, as in IVF, they are non-viable or ‘surplus’ to the woman’s or couple’s
goals for family creation, but because they have been diagnosed as being affected by a
particular genetic condition that the woman/couple wish to avoid.
 
Methods
 
The project from which this paper reports explored what actual and potential ethical,
social, clinical and legal dilemmas genetic developments and new reproductive technologies
pose for practitioners, scientists, policy makers and others working in the area of PGD,
and the social processes, meanings and institutions that frame and produce ‘ethics’ and
‘ethical problems’. Although there have been a number of studies on the experiences and
views of women/couples undergoing PGD and/or IVF (Franklin 1997; Becker 2000), there
is a lack of research on the views of staff and policy makers, so this research focused speciﬁcally
on their experiences and views.
The project used multiple methods to study two sites, both Assisted Conception Units
(ACU) in teaching hospitals in England which offer a mixture of National Health Service
(NHS), private, or ‘self-funded’ NHS treatment. The clinics provide a range of services
including IVF to women and couples who need fertility treatment, and PGD, which requires
many of the same procedures and technologies.
Following Ethics Committee approval, our research included observation in clinics; inter-
views with staff from a range of disciplines including nursing, obstetrics and gynaecology, 
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ultrasonography, embryology, molecular and cyto-genetics, and administration; and ethics
discussion groups (EDGs) facilitated by a specialist in medical ethics. This paper draws on
the set of 26 staff interviews and ﬁve EDGs from our ﬁrst study site, generated between
May and December 2005. Participants were recruited following explanations of the
research and informal follow-up approaches from the researchers, and included staff from
each of the disciplines working in the clinic. The interviews were conducted as ‘guided
conversations’ (Loﬂand and Loﬂand 1984), lasting between one and two hours. Open-
ended questions and an informal interview schedule were used, with themes including:
views on treatment eligibility for PGD; views about the genetic conditions that should be
tested for; the status of the embryo; and the value and efﬁcacy of regulatory systems such
as the HFEA. Topics for the EDGs were generated from a content analysis of the 26 staff
interviews, and by asking participants what issues they felt could usefully be discussed in
the groups (Alderson 
 
et al.
 
 2002). Most of those interviewed participated in an EDG,
although a number of staff who were not interviewed also took part. The groups lasted
two hours each, and all the discussions were tape-recorded and transcribed.
Transcripts were analysed for this paper using a modiﬁed version of the framework
approach (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). Sections of the transcripts relating to topics such as
the status of the embryo, and allowing embryos to perish, were selected and examined to
produce a framework of themes. Sections of the transcripts relating to these themes were
then grouped together and analysed further to generate sub-topics. Study numbers are used
to protect anonymity, and for the same reason reference to occupations is in general terms
rather than speciﬁc job titles, so, for example, the category of ‘counsellor’ could include
specialist genetics counsellors who provide genetics information or counsellors who work
primarily with women/couples on emotional issues. We present quotes selected from the
interviews and the EDGs not necessarily to argue for their generalisability but to show the
variety of views amongst people doing the same kind of work. We found a similar diversity
of views in our second site, but have not included those data in this paper for reasons
of space, including the need that would then be generated to explain similarities and
differences between the two sites. We wish to stress, therefore, that the views presented here
pertain to the medical and wider cultural, historical and legal context in which they
occurred. Our ﬁndings are therefore limited and we do not make claims as to their gener-
alisability to other sites within the UK or to settings outside the UK.
We were aware of the possible effects that our own role as researchers may have had in
generating the focus on the status of the embryo, and possibly creating some ambivalent
feelings in staff through asking questions in certain ways and the setting up of the EDGs
in a particular format, which provided opportunities for staff to explore potentially chal-
lenging topics. Brief telephone-based evaluations of the groups, in which each participant
commented on the experience, highlighted the high level of trust generated in the EDGs.
A few participants, however, were more constrained than in the interviews, for example,
because they did not wish to reveal very personal feelings, including ambivalence, to col-
leagues. We regard this as support for our view that bringing the two kinds of information
together to bear on our discussion is a fruitful approach.
 
Themes
 
In this section of the paper we start with how staff in the interviews regarded the question
of the status of the embryo, to illustrate the extent to which the staff held personal views
that were in alignment or differed from the current policy formulation, and the ways in 
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which these views linked with particular work goals within IVF and PGD. We then present
their views about discarding embryos or making them available for research, and go on to
explore some of the strategies they employed for dealing with or reconciling these feelings
when they were not in full accord with the ‘ofﬁcial’ account. In the last part of this section
we include data from the EDGs to explore some of the ways in which staff negotiate a
variety of ethical positions within the institution in pursuit of their overarching work goals.
 
Status of the embryo
 
Many different versions of the status of embryos were produced in the interviews, with
some staff holding views that spanned more than one of the categories produced here.
Their comments mainly refer to three-to-ﬁve-day-old embryos being tested as part of the
PGD process. Participants’ views are presented here in terms of the degree to which moral
signiﬁcance is attached to the embryo at different stages.
 
A bunch of cells
 
The ﬁrst category ﬁts most closely with the ofﬁcial version of the pre-14-day-old embryo as
deserving respect but not holding full moral or ‘human’ status. In this category, biological
characteristics of embryos were privileged over their social or moral value, for example
referring to embryos as ‘material’, ‘just a bunch of cells’, not ‘entitled to any special rights’
(Scientist 3) or ‘just a bundle of cells’ (Embryologist 5). This is the least problematic view
because construction of the embryo as ‘material’ means that a relationship with embryos
as work objects can be formed that raises the least conﬂict for staff between one of the
effects of IVF and PGD work goals (eventual destruction of embryos) and the embryo’s
potentially morally contested social value.
 
Cells with special potential
 
In this category, the embryos are still seen as a collection of cells, but as Embryologist 5
says, the embryo is ‘deﬁnitely special . . . because it has this potential’. Similarly, Embryol-
ogist 15 sees embryos not as humans but ‘as potential’. Focusing on the potential of the
embryo is consistent with the treatment goals of PGD and IVF and, similarly, may raise
few ethical problems for staff because the value of embryos is still predominantly in terms
of their biological/material value. However, some IVF staff made distinctions about the
nature of this potential, linked to differences between the treatment (and work) goals of
IVF and PGD. That is, the goal of IVF is to help create a successful pregnancy, while for
PGD it is to produce a ‘healthy baby’, which entails the destruction of some embryos that
would have been transferred in IVF.
 
A life/beings/babies
 
In contrast to the ﬁrst two categories, a few participants went a step further and deﬁned
the embryo as ‘a life’ (Nurse 4) or ‘the start of life’ (Doctor 24), marking a departure from
the previous categories because ‘a life’ seems to signify an increase in social value from the
bunch of cells that ‘can’t do anything’, or as an entity which is valued for its potential rather
than its current status. Further, some staff used the words ‘beings’ and ‘babies’ to describe
embryos. This view is usually found in the discourse opposing PGD or research using
embryos, so was perhaps more unexpected. Scientist 2 sees embryos as ‘little beings’ from
conception, and Doctor 6 tells patients, ‘we’re replacing two embryos or two little babies’.
Doctor 14 remembers going to the incubator to ‘say “hello” to my babies’, and says, ‘It is 
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difﬁcult to see them as a cluster of cells because they aren’t.’ These participants expressed
some mixed feelings when they talked about working with embryos and were more sensitive
about the fate of embryos that are not selected. Nurse 4 and Doctor 6 seemed generally
more oriented to the work goals of IVF, whereas Doctors 24 and 14, and Scientist 2 were more
broadly committed to the PGD goal of helping women/couples to have a ‘healthy baby’.
 
Staff perceptions about discarding embryos or donating them for research
 
Diversity of opinion on the status of the embryo relates in complex ways to views about
what can be done with the embryos created. Once again, staff views combined comments
about their work practices and goals with their views about the status of embryo.
 
Acceptance
 
As might be expected, those who regarded the embryo as having no special status relied upon
these beliefs when explaining why they accepted discarding embryos or donating them for
research. Scientist 8 thought it was ‘absolutely ﬁne to discard embryos’ because they have
no central nervous system, feeling of pain, consciousness, concept of their own identity, or
any interest in their own future existence. Counsellor 17 sees embryos as a ball of cells with
no soul, no being, and not in an environment where they’re going to grow and develop into
a pregnancy, ‘so research on embryos is something that I have no problem with at all’.
Acceptance of the disposal of PGD embryos when they are ‘affected’, or non-viable is
consistent with a construction of the embryo that prioritises the overarching work goal of
PGD. Counsellor 10 feels ‘comfortable with the fact that not all embryos will be transferred
and that’s part of the treatment and that’s okay’, and Doctor 24 considers that ‘in a way
it is killing . . . but we are ﬁne balancing it to the bigger social requirements . . . the end
result of why we are doing it, for me is justiﬁcation by itself’. These views differ from the
ﬁrst form of acceptance because they are not dependent on a view of the embryo as having
no special status, and may even coexist with regarding embryos as the start of life, but
priority is given to the PGD work goal.
 
Potentially problematic views about discarding embryos
 
Considering the ofﬁcial account of the embryo not having full moral status, the policy
formulation accepting research on embryos, and the general acceptance amongst most staff
that one of the effects of the treatment goal of PGD is the disposal of more embryos than
in IVF, it was interesting to hear expressed potentially problematic feelings about discard-
ing embryos, and not always within what might be thought of as work goal boundaries.
Scientist 2, whose work is oriented in the PGD team, referred to ‘throwing away potential
people’ and having to decide ‘how to deal with it because I’m actually killing something’,
while Nurse 4, whose work did not entail handling embryos, ‘couldn’t be an embryologist
because . . . they have to get rid of the embryos that are not used . . . that would be my
problem’. Embryologist 7 feels ‘quite sad’ about disposing of stored embryos: ‘because of
death . . . such a waste of embryos, producing, freezing and discarding them, and treating
them as something that’s for disposal’; and Embryologist 26 sometimes feels that discard-
ing ‘beautiful’ embryos ‘is actually quite painful’.
Although the variety of feelings reported in these ﬁrst two themes was clearly only part
of our participants’ overall experience, these feelings do represent a more diverse and
sometimes ambivalent construction of embryos and are rarely if ever reported. In these
comments, we can see a variety of reasons why discarding embryos could be an issue for these 
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members of staff, including the matter of how directly they are involved in this aspect of
the overall treatment process (see also Farsides, Williams and Alderson 2005). Thinking
about the destruction of embryos as part of the work brings out ambivalent feelings and
raises potential problems for some staff with a variety of work goals and points of view on
the status of the embryo. The diversity of micro-level work goals, within an overarching
work goal of the ACU to offer the option of PGD, may also be constituted by different
occupational orientations and religious views, but these did not fall neatly into distinct
professional categories.
 
Strategies for managing potentially problematic views about embryos
 
We now turn to some of the strategies staff employ to deal with potentially problematic
views about discarding embryos or their donation for research.
 
Avoiding thinking about it
 
Doctor 6 expresses the view that life starts at fertilisation, and says that he tries not to think
about embryos being discarded or used for research, but if those embryos are non-viable,
he is ‘happy with that’. The concept of ‘viability’ helps him to focus instead on a biologi-
cally orientated construction of the embryo and the overarching treatment goal.
 
Rationalising/distancing
 
This leads on to a related strategy of privileging logical or rational arguments over potenti-
ally problematic feelings in order to continue the work. Doctor 6 argues that his job ‘has
only been brought about through extensive research on normal embryos. It would therefore
be very hypocritical of me to then sit here and say I’m unhappy with it, because I mustn’t
be unhappy, otherwise I wouldn’t be here.’ By privileging the logical necessity of embryo
research within his IVF work goal of creating life, he achieves less conﬂict. Embryologist
15 employs a distancing strategy, arguing that thinking of embryos as human beings ‘would
drive you crazy. I think it would do your head in if you saw everything as human. I think
you don’t ever forget the potential of each embryo. But you have to have some sort of
distance from them to enable you to work with them, because if you’ve got any sort of
emotional attachment to them . . . it would be almost impossible to work that way.’ Many
of the staff who talked about the embryo as potential tended to focus on the lack of full
moral status and therefore did not express strong feelings of ambivalence, but Embryologist
15 describes getting ‘a pang of like, a lost potential’ when embryos do not go on to
implantation. These feelings about embryos could make her working life difﬁcult. Con-
structing embryos as moral work objects in her case means creating some moral and
emotional distance from them, so that she can work with them.
 
Prioritising reproductive autonomy over personal views
 
A further position is to prioritise women’s/couples’ choice as a work goal over more personal
feelings. Embryologist 26 supports abortion and a woman’s right to exercise reproductive
choice, even if this causes personal conﬂict: ‘If you feel you’ve done the best you can for
the patient and this is their wishes, it tugs at your heart strings to throw away a beautiful
embryo, but if it’s what they want, then so be it.’ This stance has similarities to the acceptance
of discarding some embryos as part of achieving the goal of PGD to achieve a ‘healthy
baby’. In this case, the overall commitment to supporting reproductive autonomy for
women is more important than the immediate consequences to some embryos or feelings 
782 Kathryn Ehrich, Clare Williams and Bobbie Farsides
 
© 2008 The Authors 
Journal compilation © 2008 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness/Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 
that may be engendered. The embryo is constructed as a moral work object that may be
discarded if required by emphasising women’s autonomy within the overall treatment goal.
 
Reconciling a diversity of constructions of the embryo as institutionally reﬂexive work
 
Strategies for dealing with thoughts and feelings about the embryo may be seen as person-
ally useful to staff in that they contribute to achieving a workable tension between poten-
tially conﬂicting ethical positions, differences between individual and overarching ACU
work goals, and the policy framework for IVF and PGD to which staff are committed. We
argue that they also perform institutional kinds of work because they ensure that personal
ethical views that are not exactly in accord with the ofﬁcial account are 
 
managed
 
, and thus
may also be seen as a form of institutional reﬂexivity. Further to the more private forms
of managing diversity on behalf of shared work goals, we discerned subtle forms of intra-
institutional boundary-work which, reﬂecting the current national policy, could be seen as
attempts to bracket off debate on the status, and destruction, of embryos.
 
Normative statements and aligning strategies
 
Several participants commented in the interviews and EDGs that if one believes that an
embryo has full moral status from the moment of conception, then one wouldn’t (and possibly
shouldn’t) be working in PGD or in a unit where destruction of embryos is part of the work.
In EDG 2, Scientist 8 said ‘if any of us believed that human beings were there in those
embryos we wouldn’t be doing the work we’re doing . . . I don’t think we could possibly do
the work with them’, and Doctor 22 and Scientist 29 made similar comments. This expresses
the logic of those with views clearly in alignment with the ofﬁcial view of the embryo, but such
comments could be perceived by colleagues with a less clearly aligned or more complex
view as somewhat prescriptive and silencing, whether or not that effect was intended. Other
instances of aligning views around the embryo as moral work object included informal talks
between senior and junior staff, such as when Scientist 9 joined the staff and was asked:
‘Do you have any problems working with embryos?’. Doctor 11 recalls: ‘One of our trainees,
who ultimately worked in the unit, hadn’t thought about that, and was absolutely thrown in
the interview process, because she did have feelings, but hadn’t had time to think about it’.
In EDG 5, Nurse 35 described how she negotiates between her personal ambivalence
and what could be seen as an internalised response to the forms of alignment referred to
above: ‘I struggle already with some of the PGD that we do . . . [then later in the meeting]
. . . But then my argument sometimes is that it’s like . . . if you don’t agree with it, you
shouldn’t be doing, you shouldn’t be in that profession . . . which is why I think it’s inter-
esting about what you were saying earlier about how people opt out of doing stuff, because
you’re still working for a fertility unit, you’re still working for [institution]. So if [institution]
are doing it, whether you’re doing it or not, you still come under that label’. In this case
the nurse’s personal views and IVF orientation sometimes sat uncomfortably with her
identiﬁcation with the unit’s overarching work goals and adherence to the predominant
ethical framework, leaving her with ambivalent feelings.
 
Prioritising the work goal of being a ‘good’ team
 
Athough many staff comments reﬂected the wider ethical acceptance of the destruction of
pre-14-day-old embryos, we observed instances in the EDGs of the group accommodating
more diverse ethical positions. No direct expressions of belief in the full moral status of
embryos were made in the groups, but staff made claims that they still function as a 
The embryo as moral work object 783
 
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness/Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 
coherent team even when individual views are not always in alignment. In EDG 1, Coun-
sellor 10 said: ‘I think as a PGD team we’re very good and we have meetings on a routine
basis . . . I don’t think I’ve been to a meeting where we haven’t discussed one of these issues,
and we don’t always agree round the table’. This highlights the importance of overarching
work goals over individual opinions, including the goal of working well together as a team.
This form of collegiate behaviour, with tolerance of diversity as a notable feature, could
also include signalling tolerance of what people are not able to say, because it shows respect
for people’s privacy and perhaps recognition that it is risky to state openly a dissenting or
ambivalent view. During EDG 2, when most of the contributions were from those who held
the ‘just a ball of cells’ view, Counsellor 28 opened up a space for an alternative view to
be expressed: ‘I have no problem discarding embryos, from a personal point of view. But
some people do. And I can understand why they do’.
Some of the participants in the EDGs displayed not only tolerance of diverse views but
responded to the opportunity to voice their ambivalence with their colleagues. Counsellor
18 spoke about struggling with ethical issues and, in contrast, choosing not to discuss this
outside the unit, reﬂecting on her awareness of public perception of her work: ‘I have, over
the years, picked up people’s things – ‘God, did you read about that?’ You know, that thing,
‘Isn’t it disgusting what we do?’ And I’m thinking, you know, actually sometimes I have a
real problem justifying what we do, myself. You know, I really do question whether this is
right, for whom is it right, why is it right, why is it wrong? And I struggle enough with that
without actually other people dealing with that’. In relating the experience of being con-
fronted with other people’s ‘disgust’, the counsellor invokes the other participants’ recog-
nition of a common difﬁculty (‘you know, that thing’) of having one’s work disapproved of
by the public. This then stands in contrast to her open expression of uncertainty or diver-
sity in the context of the group, and by implication suggests she experiences the team as
trustworthy and supportive.
In the third and fourth themes we have explored ways in which staff negotiate with the
prevailing social order, 
 
i.e.
 
 the ethical and regulatory formulation that allows for destruc-
tion of pre-14-day-old embryos as part of the overall work goals of PGD and IVF. We are
building particularly on Casper’s (1998a,b) ﬁndings because staff working in this morally
contested and multidisciplinary ﬁeld need continually to ‘remake’ aspects of the social
order in a similar way to those working in fetal surgery. We argue that staff working in this
ACU remake the ethical and regulated social order of work with embryos locally by
employing normative, accommodating, and prioritising strategies to achieve shared work
goals despite diverse constructions of the embryo and micro-level work goals. Thus the embryo
is constructed as a moral work object in diverse forms that allow the staff to do their work.
As Allen (1997) suggests, this points to the value of looking at processes in which social
order is ‘continuously accomplished rather than negotiated’ (1997: 515) and in a more subtle
way than suggested by Casper. It may be that staff choose to work in the ﬁeld and parti-
cular units because they are in accord with the prevailing ethical framework, and this may
be the most comfortable position for some individuals and for particular units as a whole.
However, it may produce a self-selected group lacking a diversity of views that could help
contribute to a ‘humane’ service (Farsides, Williams and Alderson 2005). Staff whose views
are not in close alignment with the predominant ethical framework need to ﬁnd ways of
managing their personal views and feelings, and we argue this may serve both personal and
institutional purposes (see also, Hochschild 1984, Fineman 1993). Belonging to a ‘good’
team appears also to be a work goal and this can take priority over some of the uncertainties
and diversity expressed. We argue that managing such uncertainties, ambivalence and
diversity of micro-level work goals are forms of institutionally reﬂexive work that further 
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constitute the embryo as ‘moral work object’, because they contribute to the group’s ethical
and moral consciousness, enhancing the work and the service provided to the unit’s clients.
 
Discussion and conclusion
 
In contrast to mass media representations that polarise stances on the ‘embryo question’,
we found that staff in one ACU held a variety of beliefs about when life begins, when an
embryo becomes morally signiﬁcant, and the acceptability of discarding embryos or donat-
ing them for research. We consider it is worth exploring this variety of views because
opening this professional ‘black box’ reveals some potential ambivalence, as suggested by
Kerr (2004), which is rarely reported. Further, our ﬁndings support Kerr and Cunningham-
Burley’s (2000) claim that institutional reﬂexivity may be observed in the setting of bound-
aries around certain areas for debate and the focus on overarching work goals, rather than
some of the consequences, which aids the professional project of expanding ‘ethically
acceptable’ clinical genetic services.
We argue further that managing potential diversity and ambivalence when staff ﬁnd their
beliefs do not exactly align with the ofﬁcial policy framework on this issue is a form of
negotiating the social order and as such can also be described as institutional work. This
involves social practices that have been largely unexplored through policy makers’ attempts
to close the debate. Although staff in this unit did not report a requirement to display
overtly a ‘correct’ construction in relation to embryos as part of the performance of their
work, in more subtle ways they may seek to construct the embryo as a moral work object
in forms that ‘ﬁt in’ with the current policy framework and enable them to continue their
work with minimal conﬂict. These attempts may have material consequences, as we saw
when Nurse 4 said she could not work in embryology because it would entail direct involve-
ment with disposal of embryos (Farsides, Williams and Alderson 2005).
Focusing on the embryo as ‘potential’, and according ‘respect’ to the embryo, are impor-
tant concepts in constituting the embryo as a moral work object. In the wider debates on the
‘embryo question’, the word ‘potential’ is given great signiﬁcance and used, for example by
those who take a pro-life stance, to argue that embryos should not be subject to any testing
or research that might destroy them. Some of our participants appear to be using the word
‘potential’ in a different, less profound, way, signalling their awareness of this aspect of the
‘specialness’ of embryos, but without according them the same degree of moral signiﬁcance.
This allows concerns about one of the more difﬁcult 
 
consequences
 
 of their work – destruction
of embryos – to be managed by some staff so that research and practice can continue.
Fundamental questions about the value of human life at the three-day-old embryo stage
may be deﬂected by prioritising instead overarching work goals such as providing women
with reproductive choice, helping to create ‘healthy babies’, and being part of a good team.
Our ﬁndings support Casper’s (1998a) argument that differences between practitioners
may be ‘mobilized in certain ways to produce a negotiated order, an outcome that supports
the overall institutional goals’ (1998a: 132). However, as Allen (1997) argues, these differ-
ences may not necessarily take on a formalised or overt negotiative character as in Casper’s
study. The negotiation we address is not so much the social order constituted by social
relations between particular professional groups; rather, negotiation of the ethical and
social order is formalised to a large extent outside, or at a ‘higher level’ bureaucratically
speaking, but is then ‘remade’ in the local context. Staff employ strategies for producing a
lack of conﬂict, one of which is to focus on particular work goals to construct the embryo
as a moral work object, even when some staff regard the embryo ontologically in ways that 
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could be problematic for them. As a further form of reﬂexivity, staff may signal tolerance
of diversity in subtle ways which minimise overt conﬂict, thus supporting the work goal of
forming a good team.
We argue that our data adds to work on ways in which deﬁning and redeﬁning the
biological and moral status of embryos may serve to overcome conﬂicts and ambivalence
and allow for new kinds of projects to develop. Ambivalence can be seen as an expected
counter effect to what can arguably be thought of as a particular form of social ordering
through reproductive and genetic technologies (avoiding the incidence of serious genetic
disorders). Clearly these processes vary over time and take different forms in different
places. For example, in contrast to when embryology’s future as a discipline entailed ascrib-
ing full ‘human’ status at the earliest stage of antenatal development (Morgan, 2003: 271),
in the contemporary UK context, the conclusion to be drawn from the policy discourse is
that the current ethical formulation is to 
 
defer
 
 full moral status to the embryo in order to
allow work on what is regarded as not fully human yet biological ‘material’.
In conclusion, we found a diversity of views, including some ambivalence, amongst staff in
one ACU relating to the prevailing policy acceptance of the destruction of pre-14-day-old
‘affected’ or ‘spare’ embryos. Diversity in micro-level work goals did not fall into distinct
professional categories although it seems that orientations more in IVF than PGD were
associated for some staff with more ambivalence. Subtle distinctions in the staff’s micro-
level work goals played a signiﬁcant part in making certain strategies for dealing with
potentially problematic views both necessary and successful, at the personal and institu-
tional levels. Some staff engage in the wider project of institutionally reﬂexive work when
they ﬁnd they need to reconcile aspects of their personal work goals and moral views about
embryos with the prevailing ethical and policy framework that supports their clinical and
scientiﬁc work and allows new projects to develop. In performing this work, staff construct
the embryo in a variety of forms of moral work object, allowing attention to shift between
micro-level and overarching work 
 
goals
 
, and away from a more problematic
 
 consequence 
 
of
their work, the destruction of human embryos. This adds a further dimension to the concept
of moral work object, and adds depth to the understanding of what it takes to maintain
the workable tensions, or broader negotiated order, that culminated in the 1990 Act.
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